we nd that command-and-control interventions guarantee policy e ectiveness irrespectively on the timing of their introduction. As command-and-control policies are always able to direct technical change toward "green" technologies and to prevent climate disasters, they constitute a valuable alternative to market-based interventions.
1

Introduction
In this work, we extend the seminal contribution of Acemoglu et al. (2012) 1 to study the e ectiveness of market-based (M-B) and command-and-control (C&C) policies in redirecting technical change towards "green" innovations, thus preventing environmental catastrophes related to climate change.
One of the major challenges faced by humankind today is the rising temperature caused by the increasing consumption of fossil fuels, and the appropriate policy responses. e debate is still unse led as some researchers call for major and immediate actions (Stern, 2007) , whereas others suggest limited and gradual policy interventions (see e.g. Nordhaus, 2007) . Acemoglu et al. (2012) contribute to such debate with a two-sector model of directed technical change, which allows to study how market-based environmental policies can a ect the development of "dirty" and "green" technologies, thus impacting on climate change. When the clean and dirty inputs are "strong "substitute (more on that in Acemoglu et al., 2012 , and in Section 3.3 below.), an optimal M-B environmental policy, grounded on a "carbon" tax and a green research subsidy, can redirect technical change towards the green sector, preventing environmental catastrophes. However, given path-dependency in the direction of technical change (Aghion et al., 2015) , the window of opportunity of such policy actions is limited: if the technology gap between the dirty and green inputs becomes su ciently high, M-B interventions are ine ective and environmental disasters will certainly occur. e policy window is shorter when the two inputs are "weak" substitutes. Moreover, in the la er case (as well as when inputs are complementary) M-B interventions cannot avoid an environmental catastrophe unless they stop the growth of the economy.
We expand the model of Acemoglu et al. (2012) to account for command-and control policies and we study their impact on technical change and climate dynamics. e adoption of regulations not grounded on market incentives is quite common in environmental policy and it appears to be very e ective. For instance, some international agreements (e.g. the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer) x an exogenous ceiling on speci c polluting concentrations. Shapiro and Walker (2015) nd that the increasing stringency of U.S. environmental regulation accounts for three quarters of the 60% decrease in pollution emissions (e.g. nitrogen oxides, particulate ma er, sulfur dioxide, and volatile organic compounds) from U.S. manufacturing in the period from 1990 to 2008. More generally, both price and quantity forms of control can solve allocation problems and there is no a priori criterion to favor one instrument over the other (Weitzman, 1974) . e choice of the most appropriate mode of control should be grounded only on its performance evaluated 1 For an extension see also Acemoglu et al. (2015) . 2 according to "economic" criteria. 2 We show that a command-and-control policy, which xes the maximum amount of dirty inputs for each unit of clean ones, is always able to redirect technical change towards the green technology independently on the timing of its implementation, and to avoid environmental catastrophes. In that, C&C policies are a valuable alternative to M-B ones to reach a green transition whenever the window of opportunity for environmental interventions is bounded. Moreover, even if the dirty and clean inputs are weak substitutes or complementary, command-and-control interventions imposing a ceiling to the use of polluting inputs, avoid disasters without halting economic growth. e rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the model. Alternative policies interventions are compared in Section 3. Finally, we discuss the results in Section 4.
2
e model e baseline structure of the model is akin to the one in Acemoglu et al. (2012) . ere is a continuum of households (composed of workers, entrepreneurs and scientists) with utility function:
where ρ is the discount rate, C is nal consumption good, and S ∈ [0,S] captures the quality of the environment. Naturally, the instantaneous utility function is increasing in consumption and environmental quality. 3
On the supply side, a homogeneous nal good is produced under perfect competition employing clean and dirty inputs Y c and Y d :
where ∈ (0, +∞) is the elasticity of substitution between the two inputs. Note that the two inputs are complements when < 1 and substitutes if > 1.
Both Y c and Y d are produced using labor and a continuum of sector-speci c machines according to the production functions:
man (1974); Buchanan (1969) ; Li and Shi (2010) and Li and Sun (2015) emphasize the drawbacks of marked-based instruments and support the use of regulation. See also Hepburn (2006) 3 with j ∈ {c, d} and α ∈ (0, 1), A jit is the productivity of machine i in sector j and x jit is the quantity of such machine. e aggregate productivity of the two sectors is de ned as:
Total labor supply is normalized to 1 and the market clearing condition for labor requires L ct +L dt ≤ 1. Machines in both clean and dirty sectors are produced by monopolistic competitive rms. e cost of producing a single machine is constant across time and sectors and corresponds to ψ = α 2 .
In both industry, an innovation occurs if a scientist successfully discovers a new design. At the beginning of each period scientists try to develop a new clean or dirty technology. If she is successful, which happens with probability η j ∈ (0, 1), she obtains a one-year patent for its machine i and becomes a monopolistic supplier. 4 Innovations increase the productivity of a machine by a factor 1 + γ, with γ > 0. Normalizing the number of scientists to 1 the market clearing condition for scientists becomes: s ct + s dt ≤ 1, where s jt indicates the share of scientists conducting research in sector j = {c, d} at time t. As scientists are randomly allocated to machines in the sector they choose, the average productivity of sector j evolves according to
e variation of environmental quality S t depends on environmental degradation linked to the production of dirty inputs, as well as on environmental regeneration due to the intrinsic dynamics of the Earth's physical and biological system:
with S t+1 bounded between 0 and S. e environmental degradation term catches the negative e ects of CO 2 emissions, 5 while the environmental regeneration term captures the absorption of CO 2 by the oceans and the biosphere (Oeschger et al., 1975; Goudriaan and Ketner, 1984; Nordhaus, 1992) . Note that if S t = 0 an environmental disaster occurs.
3 Climate policies and the direction of technical change
In this section we rst recall the laissez-faire equilibrium (Section 3.1), where no environmental policies are in place. We then study the impact of di erent environmental policies aiming at redirecting technical change towards the green sector in order to reduce the total amount of dirty inputs used 4 In sectors where the innovation process is unsuccessful, a one-year patent is randomly assigned to one of the producers using the old technology. 5 One could reasonably de ne CO2 emissions as directly proportional to the use of dirty inputs:
in the economy and avoid environmental disasters. More speci cally, we compare the success of market-based policies (cf. Section 3.2), based on carbon tax and subsidies to the clean sector, visa-vis command-and-control interventions (cf. Section 3.3), which x ceilings for the production of dirty inputs.
e laissez-faire equilibrium
As in Acemoglu et al. (2012) , an equilibrium is represented by a sequence of wages (w t ), prices for inputs (p jt ) and machines (p jit ), demands for inputs (Y jt ) and machines (x jit ), labor (L jt ), quality of environment (S t ) and research allocations of scientists (s jt ) such that: rms maximize their pro ts, scientists maximize their expected pro ts, labor and input markets clear, and environmental quality evolves according to (6). We recall that the laissez-faire equilibrium occurs when no environmental policies are in place.
In line with Acemoglu et al. (2012) , let us assume that the productivity of the green sector is su ciently lower than the one of the dirty industry:
. Assumption 1 will hold throughout the rest of the paper. If > 1, innovation occurs only in the dirty sector and the long run growth rate of dirty inputs is γη d . If < 1, innovation happens rst in the clean sector, then it will occur also in the fossil fuel one and the long run growth rate of dirty inputs will be (
If assumption 1 holds and > 1, the laissez-faire allocation will always produce an environmental disaster, i.e. S t = 0 for some t (Acemoglu et al., 2012) .
Note that the direction of technical change is determined by the incentives scientists face when they decide to conduct their research in the clean or dirty sector. More speci cally, the relative bene t from undertaking research in sector c rather than in sector d is expressed by the ratio (Acemoglu et al., 2012) :
Equation (7) reveals that the relative pro tability of research in the two sectors can be decomposed in three components which capture productivity di erentials (A ct−1 /A dt−1 ), relative prices
, and market size (L ct /L dt ). Finally, the equilibrium demand of the two inputs is determined by:
whose evolution over time depends on the sectoral allocation of scientists (cf. Equation 7), and on the stochastic process characterizing the dynamics of machines' productivity.
Market-based environmental policies
In the model, a market-based (M-B) environmental policy is composed of a carbon tax and a subsidy towards clean research proportional to rms' pro ts. When the two inputs Y c and Y d are substitutes ( > 1) and the economy is initially stacked in the bad laissez-faire equilibrium, Acemoglu et al. (2012) shows that the social planner can redirect technical change towards the green technology introducing a carbon-tax t d on the production of dirty inputs and a public subsidy q ct supporting the research in the clean sector. 6 Moreover, if the two inputs are strong substitutes ( > 1/(1 − α)),
M-B policy is temporary.
However, the direction of technical change is not only dependent on policy variables (t dt and q ct ). In fact, the past history of innovations, which in turns determines the relative productivity of the clean and dirty sectors and the pro tability of performing research therein, plays a fundamental role. As a consequence, given the importance of path dependency (Aghion et al., 2015) , even if carbon taxes and subsidies might a ect the direction of technical change, they cannot always push the economy away from a bad, carbon-intensive equilibrium.
Proposition 1. Assume > 1 and that Assumption 1 holds. Let (q ct , t dt ) be a policy scheme composed by a nite subsidy q ct for the clean sector and a carbon tax t dt on the production of dirty inputs lower than their unitary price,
is ine ective in re-directing technical change towards the clean sector,
(ii) the unique equilibrium allocation of scientists is s dt = 1 and s ct = 0 for any t > 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Proposition 1 shows that market-based environmental policies fail whenever the productivity differentials between the dirty and clean sectors is su ciently large. e intuition behind such a result is that once the relative productivity advantage of dirty technology is su ciently big, it will always compensate the cost of the carbon tax and the bene t of the subsidy. is happens because the policy scheme a ects the relative pro tability of clean technology only via the market size e ect. 6 roughout the model we assume that subsidies have to be nite and the carbon tax, expressed as a percentage of the price of dirty inputs, must be lower than one. In particular t dt ≤ θ < p dt and qct ≤ ϑ < +∞. Notice that if such assumption does not hold, the model collapses to a degenerate case of a one-sector economy where the issue of directed technical change becomes completely meaningless.
6 Accordingly, potential entrepreneurs will always maximize expected pro ts by investing in the carbon-intensive sector, thereby undermining the e ectiveness of the carbon tax. Furthermore, the next proposition states that the probability of passing the productivity thresholdĀ d , above which market-based policies are ine ective, approaches 1 as time goes by Proposition 2. Assume that > 1 and that Assumption 1 holds. en
Proof. See Appendix A.2 e main consequence of Proposition 2 is that the timing of the introduction of market-based environmental policies is crucial. If the economy is stacked in the bad equilibrium (s d = 1), then there exists a bounded window opportunity for policy scheme (q ct , t dt ) to be e ective. More precisely, the window opportunity for a market based policy introduced at time T lasts (log(
periods.
Remark 1. Given the evolution of the quality of the environment (Equation 6), a too much delayed policy intervention inevitably leads to an environmental disaster. Indeed, as the economy is stacked in a bad equilibrium (s d = 1), Y dt increases at a rate of γη d , M-B policies become ine ective and S t reaches zero in nite time, thereby producing a disaster.
Remark 2. e higher the elasticity of substitution between the two inputs ( ), the shorter the time window in which M-B policies are e ective.
e intuition underlying the last remark is straightforward. If the elasticity of substitution of clean and dirty inputs increases, producers will have higher incentives to switch towards the cheaper dirty ones, creating additional demand for these inputs. Accordingly, the relative profitability of dirty inputs increases, reducing the threshold A d above which policy interventions are ine ective.
Carbon taxes are a meaningful tool for emission control policy. At the same time, Proposition 1 and 2 show that, when markets are competitive and dirty and clean inputs are substitutes, their e ectiveness cannot be guaranteed a priori. e productivity gap between carbon-intensive and green technologies becomes crucial for the success of M-B environmental policies. In addition such a gap widens over time due to the sub-martingale nature of machines' productivity (cf. proof of Proposition 2), implying that delayed interventions are likely to be ine ective. Table 1 provides numerical experiments supporting these claims. It considers di erent scenarios de ned by the expected productivity growth, initial relative backwardness of clean technologies 7 and the size of the subsidy. In many cases, the window of opportunity for market-based policy lasts very few periods and, the carbon tax needed to redirect technical change is extremely high.
For example, when the productivity of clean technologies is initially half of the dirty ones and the expected productivity growth is high, the carbon tax required to move the economy towards the "green" equilibrium is above 35% and it has to be introduced by 30 periods. Would the backwardness of clean technologies be higher, the minimum tax would correspond to 61% of dirty sector's revenues and the window of opportunity reduces to around 20 periods. Note: Low, medium and high expected productivity growth correspond to an average growth rate of machines' productivity of, 1%, 3% and 8% respectively. With asymmetric expected productivity growth, they corresponds to 8% for dirty technologies and 3% for clean ones.
A further insight on the potential shortness of M-B's e ectiveness period is provided by gure 1. Numerical simulations of the model under di erent technological regimes (that correspond to the technological opportunities in the two sectors) allow to illustrate the dynamics of productivities, which in turns drive the magnitude of the minimum carbon tax that would move economy toward a "green" development path. Results shows that in many circumstances, minimum taxes rapidly reach the unit and become ine ective as a policy instrument.
Given such dismal results, are there alternative policy interventions that always redirect technical change towards the green sector, thus preventing climate catastrophes? In the next Section, we will show that such objectives can be achieved by appropriate command-and-control policies. 
Note: gures on the le column (a,c,e) show the Monte Carlo average dynamics of productivities and minimum carbon tax to redirect technical change obtained across 100 independent runs; gures on the right column (b,d,f) show the relationship between average carbon taxes and the ratio between clean and dirty sector productivity, each point represents a period. Each row of gures is characterized by di erent technological regimes: low (a,b) corresponds to an average productivity growth of 1%, medium (c,d) corresponds to an average productivity growth of 3%, high (e,f) corresponds to an average productivity growth of 8%. All simulations are obtained se ing = 10, α = 1/3 and initial the initial productivity ratio Ac0/A d0 = 0.8.
Command-and-control policies
A command-and-control (C&C) policy refers to an environmental intervention that relies on regulation (permission, prohibition, standard se ing and enforcement) as opposed to nancial incentives, 9
that is, economic instruments of cost internalization (UN, 1997). In particular, we consider a policy that establishes the maximum amount κ of dirty inputs that can be used for each unit of clean ones: 7
where κ ∈ R + represents the command-and-control policy chosen by the government and introduced at time T . Given Assumption 1, in the laissez-faire equilibrium innovations start in the more productive dirty sector. Moreover, if > 1 and given Equations (8) and (9), C&C policies (cf.
Equation 10) will be binding in equilibrium.
e dirty (Y dt ) and clean (Y ct ) inputs are employed competitively by nal good producers, which maximizes their pro ts according to:
Under the C&C policy, rst-order conditions give:
In both the laissez-faire equilibrium and market-based policies, the relative demand of inputs is determined competitively (the relative price of clean inputs compared to dirty ones is decreasing in its relative supply). In contrast, under command-and-control policies, the government indicates a relative upper bound on the use of dirty inputs (κ), which implicitly constrains the gap between the prices of the two sectors. Furthermore, relying on (12), it is possible to express the relative employment in the clean sector as
Equation (13) implies that whenever the relative demand of dirty inputs is constrained by the C&C policy, any productivity gain in the carbon intensive sector is labor destroying. Indeed, since rms cannot expand production, any increases in machine productivity will increase pro ts by reducing the number of employees needed to serve a constant demand. e pro tability ratio of conducting research in the two sectors than becomes:
where the second equality follows combining (7) with (12) and (13), and the third one is obtained via (5). From the last equation it follows that under a command-and-control policy κ the expected pro tability of the two sectors in equilibrium does not depend on the productivity of currently available machines as in the laissez-faire and market-based policy cases, but only on the relative likelihood of obtaining a successful innovation and κ. We can now state the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Consider a C&C policy κ. If > 1, then there exists a niteκ > 0 such that any κ >κ always redirects technical change towards the green sector.
Proof. See Appendix A.3 e main intuition behind Proposition 3 is that any C&C policy, which su ciently limits the relative share of dirty inputs, creates an additional demand for clean ones, increasing the pro tability of the green sector. If such a policy is implemented, technical change moves towards a development path where innovations occur only in the clean sector. Moreover, once the new equilibrium is achieved, the economy behaves as in the "good" laissez faire scenario, where output Y t and use of clean inputs Y ct grows at the long-run rate γη c (see equations 8, 9 and 4 and recall that A ct grows at a rate of γη c while A dt remains constant).
Remark 3. A temporary C&C policy intervention κ is su cient to redirect technical change permanently.
Indeed, as the economy moves toward a "good" equilibrium, Y ct grows faster than Y d , as the clean sector is more pro table than the dirty one, thus increasing the ratio Y ct /Y dt . e commandand-control policy sustains the improvement of machines' productivity in the clean sector, thereby increasing the ratio A ct /A dt . When such ratio becomes su ciently high, the C&C policy is not needed anymore as research is spontaneously performed only in the clean sector.
Command-and-control policies can always redirect technical change towards the clean sector, but are they able to prevent of natural disasters (S t = 0)? In other words, what happens to the environment when in equilibrium innovation occurs only in the green sector?
Given the results in Acemoglu et al. (2012) and using equations (8) and (9), one can conclude that when all scientists are allocated to the clean sector (s ct = 1), the production of dirty inputs (Y dt ) grows at a rate (1 + γη c ) α+γ − 1 > 0, if the the two inputs are weak substitutes (i.e. 1 < < 1/(1 − α)). In contrast, when inputs are strong substitutes ( > 1/(1 − α)), Y dt behaves in the long run as A α+ϕ ct , which in turns decreases over time. e above results imply that appropriate climate policies are able to prevent environmental catastrophes only when dirty and clean inputs are strong substitutes. More precisely, C&C policies are always successful in avoiding S t to reach zero, whereas M-B solutions are e ective only if they are implemented at the right time. If inputs are weak substitutes instead, nal good production requires increasing amount of dirty inputs which cannot be replaced by clean ones, even though the productivity of dirty machines keeps constant. As a results an environmental disasters looks inevitable.
Given such a gloomy perspective, is there an environmental policy that work even if clean and dirty inputs are weak substitutes? e next proposition provides a positive answer:
Proposition 4. Letκ be a C&C policy imposing a xed ceiling on the use of dirty inputs Y dt such that Y dt ≤κ. en, there exists a niteκ > 0 such that ∀κ ∈ (0,κ ) the policy always redirects technical change towards the green sector and prevents an environmental disaster.
Proof. See Appendix A.4 e claim follows straightforwardly from proposition 3 and equation (6). 8 A xed-ceiling C&C policy is always e ective, even when the dirty and clean inputs are complementary, whereas in Acemoglu et al. (2012) disasters can be avoided only by switching o economic growth. Table 2 summarizes the results of the di erent types of policy explored in the paper. 
Conclusions
In this work we have extended the model developed by Acemoglu et al. (2012) policies are grounded on a carbon tax and a subsidy to the green sector, whereas C&C interventions x limits to the production of dirty inputs (and greenhouse gas emissions). Table 2 provides a summary of our results. We nd that market-based policies are not always successful to redirect technical change from the dirty to the green sector. Given the cumulativeness of technical change (Aghion et al., 2015) , time is fundamental: there is a limited window of opportunity to trigger a green transition, a er that the productivity gap between the dirty and green sector becomes so high that M-B policies are ine ective. e time for an e ective intervention gets shorter if the two inputs are "weak" substitutes. In la er case, market-based policies are never able to prevent an environmental catastrophes. On the contrary, if the dirty and green inputs are "strong" substitutes, timely M-B interventions can successfully avoid the occurrence of disasters.
Command-and-control policies can always redirect technical change toward the green sector.
In that, they are more e ective than market-based interventions. Such result occurs because M-B policies work only via the market size channel (larger input sector stimulates innovation), whereas C&C interventions also a ect the relative price and are not limited by the productivity gap between the dirty and green technologies (cf. Equation 7). is explains why the evolution of the technologies do not a ect the success of command-and-control policies, which are also always e ective in preventing environmental disasters when inputs are strong substitutes. If the dirty and green inputs are weak substitutes, the only environmental policy that allows to avoid a climate catastrophe is a C&C intervention xing an absolute limit on the use of polluting inputs. Without loss of generality, let θ = p dT − δ with δ ∈ R + . en, using the de nition of limit, for all δ > 0, it exists aĀ d ∞, such that for all, r >Ā d , one obtains p dT − g(r) < δ, which in turns implies g(r) > p dT − δ. Finally, there exists a nite r and a su ciently low δ such that, in order to redirect technical change, it is required t dT > g(r) > θ, which is impossible because it contradicts our assumptions. Now let us show that the equilibrium where all researchers are employed in the dirty sector (s = 0) is also the unique equilibrium when A dT −1 is su ciently large. Two cases must be distinguished.
First, if 1 + ϕ > 0, then f (s) is strictly decreasing in s and f (0) < 1 guarantees that s = 0 is the unique equilibrium. e previous condition can be rewri en as follows:
which implies
where Ψ > 0. As > 1, the le hand side of (18) is a continuous function monotonically decreasing in A dT −1 which tends to 0 as the productivity of machines in the dirty sector becomes larger and larger. is proves that for a su ciently large A dT −1 , the unique equilibrium allocation of scientists satis es s = 0.
Now consider the second case where 1 + ϕ < 0. As f (s) is strictly increasing in s, the unique equilibrium is s = 0 only if f (0) < f (1) < 1, where the rst inequality is obviously satis ed.
Consider the second inequality:
